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PRINCIPLES OF OPENING STRATEGY: HOW TO PLAY ALONG THE SIDE

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(This translation from the works of Takagawa was done by J. Haneda and Roger A. Newlander, and is taken from Volume 3 of "The Grand Strategy Game of Go". By the kind permission of Mr. Newlander, this material has been made available to the Go Journal, and the present double issue has been designed to give our readers the entire section on "How to Play along the Side". This is the largest and most important part of the discussion of Fuseki or Opening Strategy, and is written in a style useful for players of almost any rank. Some re-editing has been done to compensate for the difference in Japanese and American styles.)

Introduction

THE GAME OF GO can be thought of as consisting of three stages: the opening strategy (fuseki); the battle or middle strategy (sense); and the end game (yose). Of these three, the opening strategy is the one on which even the best players spend the most time. It is also this stage that amateur players find the most difficult.

This is quite understandable as the middle game and end game can be studied and definite conclusions reached, while in "fuseki" everyone has his own idea and policy. One often finds the word "may" inserted in sentences---it may be good," or "this may be possible". In this com-

plexity lies the difficulties of fuseki, but also its added interest.

Fuseki is still the foundation on which Go is formed, and often decides the outcome of the whole game. If players of close strength meet, the one who is the most proficient in fuseki will usually win.

To define "fuseki" a little more closely, we must remember that Go is a fighting game, and the battle of the middle game is quite important. Fuseki is the preparation for this battle. Quite often it is said that fuseki is the laying out of future territories. This is not quite true. It is more a building of camps or fortifications---in short, a getting ready for the battle of territory.

Axioms

(In his opening chapter on how to handle the corners, Takagawa presents two important axioms:

I. Rule for the Corner, Side and Center: A player creates the greatest "placement value" in the corner, then on the side, and last in the center.

II. Axiom for the Third and Fourth Line: The third and fourth lines are the lines of strength. . . Fuseki is not the play on the second or fifth lines but the combination of third and fourth. It is the method of keeping a balance between actual gain and potential power.)

HOW TO PLAY ALONG THE SIDE

I. Large Placements near the Side Stars




Diagram 1

Looking at Diagram 1, we see a situation where black and white have each closed two corners, and are considering plays along the side. The points below the four side stars (K3, R10, K17 and C10) or any of the other points adjacent to these stars are considered "large placements". Considering any of the four areas in Diagram 1 where a stone might be placed, it should be noted that a "large extension point" for white would also be a large extension point for black. It therefore becomes important to decide which of these points to occupy first, as the opponent would also like to occupy these points. If the theory of opening strategy made it impossible to vary the order of occupying these points, then Go would be very dull. The fact is that the possibilities are so complicated that one can find endless interest in experimenting.

Diagram 2 illustrates the continuation from corner closing to large placements. If white's corners were identical, there would be no priority between K3 and K17, but the lower




Diagram 2

right corner is weaker than the upper left so that black plays 9 as shown. 11 extends the sphere of influence from his lower left corner in the most profitable direction. 9 and 11 together form a very desirable position: they both span five points from the base so that another stone placed midway at a later date would ideally create two three-line spans. White places 12 at a short distance from his base instead of playing R11, as he is being menaced by 9.




Diagram 3

If white did play at R11 on his 12th move, black would follow with °3 gaining area and also severely attacking the corner. White's counter-attack at N17 is not a threat to black's upper right corner, as black can always secure his position with R13. The important thing to remember here is the move °12 before 13.

In Diagram 3, we see a different situation where °8 has preceded the closing of both lower corners. Also °7 responded directly to the attack of °6 instead of attacking one of the lower corners himself; white would then occupy C17, and black would lose all the advantage of °1. °8 protects °6, for if it were neglected black would counter with °H17.

Black could have placed °9 in the other corner--this choice can make a great difference, but the merits and demerits cannot be decided immediately. °10 precedes °14 as a means of defense of the original °2, and °11 and °13 form a model Joseki. °13 is very important for black, since otherwise white would occupy R4. The meaning of this move is so great that it equals in importance a primary placement in the corner.

These moves finish the initial phases of fuseki, and now the large extensions along the left and right side remain to be played. In Diagram




Diagram 4

4, °15 extends six lines from the upper left hand base, and threatens to occupy C6. °16 strengthens the base, and threatens in turn to make an invasion later at some point above. If white played °16 to the right of his base, the position would be too heavy on the lower side and would be considered a misplacement of power.

°17 expects °18, °19 and °21. A possibility for breaking in later between 17 and 21 exists, but the fact that °21 threatens white's base should be especially noted.

White's exchange of °22 with °23 is considered even. The moves could be reversed, but then black might play L17 and threaten the two white stones. This black extension also gathers in a large area. °23 is the last large extension: after this, the middle game or battle begins.




Diagram 5

In Diagram 5, the corner play is completed after °10. The formation in the lower left corner gains strength and outside influence from three stones. °7 and °8 were given priority to other corner plays: in the situation caused by °5, °6 and °7, the white response °8 is very important. The large extensions made by each player are shown in the balance of the diagram.




Diagram 6

In Diagram 6, note that °10 plays on the second line. This does not contradict all that was said about the importance of the third and fourth line, since it is a necessary auxiliary move to the other points on the third and fourth.

°12 is played at an important central point, preceding the closing of the upper left hand corner.

Up to °17, each in turn played along the side or slightly closer to the center. White 18 occupied a large placement point along the upper side. If white did not play here, then of course black would have on his next move. Because of this possibility, white allows °19 to attack the corner. This is one of the examples where a "large placement point" along the side precedes the closing of the corner.

After °30, black can occupy °S17, after which white would play R8. But if black plays R9, white extends with S17. This choice is "an even break".

II. Extensions

Extensions can be made from three to six lines from a given stone. In Diagram 7, black makes a six-line extension in the upper left hand area; white makes a three-line extension on the right, and a five-line extension




Diagram 7

on the lower left. The three-line extension is the strongest of all. Although these are all on the third line, often a fourth-line extension turns out to have better effects.

In Diagram 8, black makes a four-line extension on the right side. On the left, °13 is a high six-line extension. (The high or low extension is determined by the situation in the lower right). °1-°11 pressed black along the side; in this situation, white must take advantage of the long wall on the left by making a large extension to the right. If he desired only a three or four line extension, he could simply make it on the first move.

The idea behind an extension can either be to prevent being sandwiched in by the opponent, or to prevent the




Diagram 8

opponent's extension. In Diagram 9, we see °1 on the left hand "sandwiching in" black's corner stone (sometimes called a pincer operation or a squeeze play). On the right hand of Diagram 9, °1 sandwiches in the white stones---white played °7 in Diagram 7 to prevent this.




Diagram 9

III. Checking the Opponent's Expansion

An extension's main aim, we have found out, can be to avoid the sandwiching in process. It would only be logical that we would have some means of "checking" the opponent's expansion. This "check" is an approach from one's own lines.

A check is a rather delicate thing to determine. For instance, in Dia-




Diagram 10




Diagram 11




Diagram 12

gram 10, °1 is a check; however, °1 is not a check. To an expert these two moves differ in meaning, as the examples below will make clearer.

In Diagram 11, °1 prevents white's extension to N17 or O17 and at the same time is an expansion for black; but it does not constitute a check. In Diagram 12, °1 is a check which does not constitute an attack against but it will facilitate an invasion at F3. It is also an extension from the right corner, and prevents an attack on this corner from M3.

In Diagram 13, °1 also facilitates an invasion and serves as an extension but it is not a check. But in Diagram 14, the check °1 makes a great difference. Now black cannot approach the large extension from M3. Thus we begin to notice that one of the effects of a check is to consolidate a large extension, with a very great effect.




Diagram 13




Diagram 14




Diagram 15

Move 1 made by black and white on either side of Diagram 15 may at first look similar, but are quite different in effect, because of the difference in the way the corners are defended. On the top, black's defense may not be shaken by the white move, but on the bottom, white's defense is shaken. (It should be observed, however, that the two corner defenses have different purposes, so the white weakness does not invalidate his position.) On both sides the check move has been made from a maximum extension; the check should not not in either case be cut down to a smaller span. White can continue on top with G14 or F14. This possibility would of course press on black's lines, and at the same time allow white to expand. These cases occur quite often in actual play.

IV. Splitting the Enemy's Lines- the "Wedge"

Before the opponent establishes or solidifies his lines, a "Wedge Stone" can be played in between the left and right bases of a formation such as Diagram 16. Once the formation is established, or solidified, a stone put in this formation would be an invasion stone and not a wedge.

A wedge move is mostly played on

the third line, where bases are easily established. These stones are usually placed below the side stars or on adjacent points, the idea being that if an opponent approaches the wedge, another stone can be placed as an expansion on the other side. This is of course the ideal point of placement of a wedge stone; if there is no room for this type of expansion, then it becomes an invasion rather than a wedge.

In Diagram 16, we have a wedge move °1. Black must decide which way to attack this wedge by considering the effects on the corners and the potential spheres of influence that will develop for both sides.

In this example, black makes a good solid base at the left, but °3 threatens the upper right area. This does not mean that °2 was bad, since after °3 the black formation to the left compensates for the attack by white on the right.




Diagram 16

Diagram 17




Diagram 17 shows the other possibility after °1; this is not very different from the previous example.

In Diagram 18, °1 is placed one line to the right. Black plays to stop from the left, and °3 is the natural response. Black is satisfied with white's confined shape. °3 can be extended to O17 (see Diagram 25) but even so black is under no particular disadvantage.

If white plays his wedge from the other side of mid-center, as in Diagram 19, °2 is necessary. It is always played on the side containing the





Diagram 18

Diagram 19



greater area, and cannot be played on the narrow side. In comparison with Diagram 17, white's confined formation should be noted.





Diagram 20

Diagram 21



In Diagram 20, black's defense against the wedge causes white to extend to the left. But in Diagram 21, black defends from the other side, where he has a small tight corner. This is a mistake, for °3 will weaken black in the right corner. °2 would have been more effective if the black stones at the left had been placed at D3 and C6. In such a situation, however, white's original wedge would be placed one line to the left, at J3. Then if black defends the right, white extends with F3 and destroys the stability of this larger corner. This will cause black to play at G3.

In Diagram 22, the wedge stone is placed in a symmetrical position. °2 and °3 might be reversed as shown. The stones which are not yet shown on




Diagram 22

the sides must be taken into account before reaching a decision. Since the approach that black makes is quite important, he may delay his move in favor of a play elsewhere. Then from the situation that develops, he will make his choice: this is rather advanced tactics. A mere stone at C10 or R10 can upset the balance in favor of a particular way to stop white.

Given the wedge play °1 of Diagram 23, which side should black stop from? Furthermore, is °1 the best point for the wedge? What about °1 of Diagram 24 instead? These are quite difficult questions to answer.

In Diagram 23, °1 cannot be a bad move, as white can extend in either direction in answer to a check from right or left. If we look at Diagram 24, we see that black is still menaced by °1, for the sequence °02, °P2, °M2 deprives him of his base. Thus °2 is questionable. He could have played against white at L3, with white answering K4. This would prevent the before mentioned threat, but the exchange is not desirable for black. Therefore black must prepare a counter-move against white that will be




Diagram 23






Diagram 24

more effective. Diagram 25 and 26 illustrate this point.

In Diagram 25, the choice of where to place the wedge is a difficult problem. White could play °3 N17 instead, but this is too narrow. Yet if he holds to °3 as shown, there is an established line to use which makes black firm and leaves white shaky: °4 O16, °5 P18, °6 P17, °7 O18, °8 Q18.



Alternatives to consider then would be to play Diagram 26, with the wedge move at K3. This is not quite satisfactory, for after black protects at (a), he threatens a counter-attack on the weak white lines. White will then suffer from a greater vulnerability than black. Thus we see finally that the black response to the wedge from the left is better than from the white. If a wedge move is exposed to such a danger, then it could not have been a good move in the first place. The idea of placing such a move is certainly not to expose the resulting formation to extreme danger.

Therefore even a very simple-looking wedge move requires careful consideration.

A wedge move is sometimes regarded as part of the tactics of the middle game, yet the wedge is mainly on the third line near the star, just as in "large placements". It can therefore be regarded as part of opening strategy. At this point there are a few additional points I would like to make regarding these "large placements".

V. Easily Overlooked Important Placements Along the Side

In Diagram 27, we see a large placement that can be easily overlooked. This "check" by black stabilizes his position, and at the same time makes




Diagram 27




Diagram 28

white insecure. If white should occupy this important point, the stability would be reversed. In Diagram 28, °1 strengthens black while building up threats against white. Here black will later be able to jump into the point F3. Again, there will be a tremendous difference if white occupies this initial checking position L3 himself.

In Diagram 29, we see another case where a two line jump can be quite important to both sides. On the upper side, °1 threatens the weak point of white's large corner. On the other hand, if white plays on this point, he protects the corner and weakens black. Such differences due to occupying an important point first should be studied as they will improve your game.




Diagram 29




Diagram 30

Diagram 30 shows what happens if white plays on a side but does not have the chance to make the consolidating move where °1 is located. Black immediately threatens the action as shown in Figures 1-4. In Figure 1, white escapes death, but black has begun to build up a large area to the left. In Figure 2, white tries °1 in place of °4 of Figure 1; in this case the result will be a formation of center power for black. Figure 3 will also suffer the same fate. Finally, Figure 4 shows a variation for black which attacks the base of the formation and drives white toward the center. In this attack also the black gain is very great.




Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3




Figure 4

VI. Important Placement Points Connected with Bases

Connecting a base to a large placement is very important and often overlooked. In Diagram 31, the difference between white's play at °1 and a move in the corner by black can be seen by comparing the upper right with the lower left. The base in the corner is very important to both sides, and the difference of who occupies this corner by an initial placement is of double significance.




Diagram 31

Such placements should often be given priority over more obvious plays. Diagram 32 is such a move. If black does not play °1, white will play °1 of Diagram 33. These important points should be occupied as soon as the large placements on the sides are finished. Notice the effect on the base of black by the placement of °3 after black tries to hold white in Diagram 33.




Diagram 32

Diagram 33




Diagram 34

Another example is given in Diagram 34. Here if white plays °1 or black plays M3 instead, the difference is very great. In these forms, placements are often on the second line, but this means that opening strategy has progressed to that stage and should not be regarded as contradictory to the axiom of the third and fourth lines.

In Diagram 35, °1 of the upper right secures the base, so there is an actual gain. At the same time this move threatens the two white stones on the upper side. Often black will play O18 instead, with white answering N18; black may then play elsewhere. In this case, though, a definite advantage for either side cannot be claimed. °1 P18 is still desirable considered from the partial view of just this corner.

If black does not play the defense given, we see what may happen in the lower left corner. After °9, black is under a decided disadvantage. Even if white simply plays E2, °D3, there will be a loss for black. The struggle for these placements often precedes some of the large placements.




Diagram 35

VII. The Balance of Placement

The axiom for the third and fourth lines has been pointed out earlier. All fuseki must follow this axiom. The balance of placement about to be explained, means the balance in arrangement of the stones between the third and the fourth lines. In Diagram 36, each contestant has extended either four or five lines from the original attack against the 3-4 corner stone. The extension of white in the right center side is common to both attacking stones--a type of arrangement often seen. In the top area, when white responded "high" with °1 on the fourth line, black answered low with °2 on the third. This is a form of balance.





Diagram 36

Now although the suitable point for white is K17, this move will not seriously affect black, because of black's low placement. In the lower left, °2 answers °1; it seems a desirable point, but it will allow °3, an ideal placement for white. In other words, °2 will not be able to neglect white's approach or white will follow up with N3. Thus °2 in the top area is placed low to prevent such moves.



In Diagram 37, white plays °3 high on the fourth line, combining third and fourth line play. Casting aside the idea that white intends to hold all the territory between °1 and °3, in general it is desirable that if one stone is placed low on one side that the other will be placed high. In the example on the lower side, one wing of white is placed low so that white places his °1 high. If °1 were low, it would be a duplication of a low placement and also invite black to enter at (a). But in this case, when °1 is high, white can play K4 above (a) without danger.

In Diagram 38, °1 and °3 are placed low so that °5 must be high on the fourth line. There are points where black might place between °1 and °5, or between °3 and °5, but even if he should do this, white will be able to connect forces. In the example of Diagram 39, °2 is the correct answer to °1. Note the balance between the third and fourth line.




Diagram 38




Diagram 39

In Diagram 40, black answers °1 with °2 on the fourth line. This is also proper and conforms to the idea of balance. If °2 were placed at G3, the position would be a duplication as far as low placements were concerned. The same idea is seen in Diagram 41, where °1 is improper. Here the play should be at J4.




Diagram 40




Diagram 41

Diagram 42 shows °1 in balance with the two black stones of the right hand side, but viewed in relation to the left, it cannot be said to be properly in balance. But if °1 were at J3 instead, this will be good in view of the entire formation. The 3-3 position in both corners will be open, but white will not gain much from entering there.




Diagram 42




Diagram 43

In Diagram 43, °1 attacks the two white stones at the left. The high placement on the fourth line is the proper move. But if black's right hand corner was defended by O4 and Q4 instead, then °1 should be low at K3.




Diagram 44




Diagram 45

In Diagram 44, black must play '1 on the fourth line, as both left and right wings are placed low. Here '1 is the center of both the wings; the high placement is not imperative, but desirable. In Diagram 45, '1 is again desirable from the standpoint of balance for both sides.

VIII. The Limits in Placing Extensions

Most readers are well aware of the principle of "two stones--four lines" pertaining to extensions on the third line. In Diagram 46, '5 is following this rule.




Diagram 46

Similarly, if there are three stones in a column, a five-line extension can be made. (See AGJ, Vol. 6 No. 1 for further discussion under Raising Your Strength: Extensions and Connections).

Stones do not necessarily have to be placed one upon another to use this rule. They can be connected in such a way as to give the greatest strength, as will be explained below.

The three-line expansions may not be perfect but they are at least safe. There is no danger of a stone being placed between them and cutting them




Diagram 47





Diagram 48

off from one another. (See AGJ, Vol. 1, No. 1, p.14). If a player makes a four-line extension, there is room for entering between the stones; but if on one side there are two stones placed together to form a side or equivalent form, this extension would also be solid.

In Diagram 47, we see the maximum extension of six lines. This does not imply that a particular extension of four or five lines is always proper, nor does not mean that one always extends to the maximum. Often one side makes an expansion of four lines even though there is room for a six line expansion. Here there is room on either side to place three line interval stones to consolidate the formations. Although an approach to the white corner by black will not have the same attacking value as in the case where the E17 stone is at E16, yet it still tends to consolidate the black lines. This would be especially true if white should place stone between '1 and the black corner. Then although both halves of the formation were separate, they would be able to exist independently. '1 of Diagram 48 is a five-line extension, leaving room for a three line jump approach to white's corner.

Diagram 49 is taken from an actual match game. Apart from the unusual shape in the upper left, we see that '1 has room enough to make a three line extension toward either the left or right. These stones are occupying a large placement area and are entire-



Point	Column	Row
1	C	4
2	L	3
3	D	5
4	G	4

Diagram 50

Diagram 51




Diagram 52

makes a maximum six-line extension, based on the potential strength of the left side due to possible white plays at D7 or E6. If black plays *6, however, then white must follow with *7 as this potential has ceased to exist. Of course if black plays elsewhere, white can also delay this defense.




Diagram 53




Diagram 54

The joseki of Diagram 55 creates a three stone wall, allowing white to expand five lines. The only drawback here in the theory is that if black plays at (a) there would be a danger of invasion at N15. (If white defends against this, black is ready for a big expansion on the right side). Thus in order to check this possibility, white




Diagram 55




Diagram 56

often resorts to only four-line extensions. Notice that this would be a foolish practice in the case of Diagram 56, where a four-line extension would enable black to consolidate the right side with a three-line jump.




Diagram 57

In Diagram 57 is shown a joseki very important in handicap play, where the extension should be six lines for '8. This is true because of the power in the upper area considered equal to four stones. The play '8 Q14 is not good for black: if he wished to play here, he did not have to play '2 at all, but could have played Q14 immediately after '1. Of course he added to his position with '2, '4, and '6, but white '3 and '5 in combination with '7 are very strong. Black's position is overstrengthened and "heavy".

Diagram 58 illustrates where it would be a bad policy to play this joseki, since the space open for black to the left is too narrow. Instead, it would be better for black to play P6 or Q7. Another example of a good extension is shown by white in the left side of this diagram.




Diagram 58

IX. Pressing or Hemming in the Third Line

With the stones placed as shown on the right of Diagram 59, black occupies '1 as shown on the right. After '2, black can press in white's formation from (a). Black could take the same action in the upper left hand corner as well. This is one of the reasons why black chooses the high 3-5 play, planning to check white's attack by pressing him in. He hopes that this possibility will compel white to make a high attack as shown in Diagram 60. A high attack is, considered by





Diagram 59

Diagram 60



itself, inferior to a low attack (because it does not make as direct a claim on territory). But even if white plays high, if he extends '6, blindly following the joseki, black can then press the position by '7. If instead of playing '6 as shown, white occupies '7 and then tries to extend, black will place a stone between the formations.

Therefore, as in 'Diagram 61, white may allow black to close the right corner in order to occupy '2 and '4 to the left.




Diagram 61




Diagram 62




Diagram 63

When there is a formation in the lower area as shown in Diagram 62, black can occupy '1 in an attempt to press the white groups as in '3-'7. If white occupies a high position instead, as in Diagram 63, '7 will still press the white stones into a low position. Therefore, instead of attacking the upper corner, white may follow the joseki as shown in Diagram 64.

In the next two examples, we will see exceptions to the idea of pressing




Diagram 64

in an opponent. In Diagram 65, '1 is in itself a good point regardless of the attack on the corner. If white should then try to press in starting at the corner, black may obligingly comply by following white along the side. Although this would be a passive defense for black, it may gain actual benefits, due to the narrow three line extension of white. Since white would not be able to utilize his wall, '1 for black would be recognized as a proper step to take.




Diagram 65




Diagram 66

In Diagram 66, white satisfies himself with a low position, allowing black to occupy 10. This will utilize the long wall to advantage, but there are times when this position will not be good for black. This may be true if the arrangement in the lower right were such that '10 itself would become pressed: this would make '1 very worth while for white.

In Diagram 67, not considering any possible arrangements that might be present in the upper left, '1 is very much needed. It threatens to extend to G3 and threaten black's corner from its basic weak point. Also, if black fails to respond to '1, white will occupy the point that black should have taken--that is P4, the press position, leaving white with an excellent formation. Therefore black must press immediately. Let us then assume the subsequent development took the form of the previous diagram. Then it will be black's turn to place along the side with R10. White will then be able to press black from the corner on the upper right, which will result in a low formation for black.

Thus black must abandon in this case the extension after the press and




Diagram 67

make some other move. This figure is taken from an actual master game, where black then played Q4. White cut into the formation by playing R10. The exceptional cases where the pressing down of an opponent's side is not desirable, however, are rare. They result from situations where the extension after the press is difficult or where the influence gained by the press is small.

In the situation of Diagram 68, °4 threatens to press down black's formation from (a), and black therefore replies at that point. This is shown with further developments in Diagram





Diagram 68

Diagram 69



69. Black has now the double threat of pressing down white's formation from both the left and right. If white stands idle, he will then find himself at a great disadvantage. In order to prevent this and because being pressed down from the 3-5 position is more threatening, white may place °1 on the right. On the other side, after black begins to press down with °2, white will answer with °3. Now white is threatening to press down on black towards the right from °1.

If white would have extended with °1 to J3, then after black begins to press from the left with P4, a low formation along the whole side for white will result.

In opening strategy, pressing down an opponent's stones is given great importance. In order to prevent an opponent's press or to minimize its effects, we arrive at some of the complexities seen in opening strategy formations. The characteristics of the 3-5 position that gives it these pressing possibilities and the value of the diagonal placement against it should be once again considered.




Diagram 70

In Diagram 70, white would like to play °1, K17, to check black's extension from the upper left. If he does this, however, he will be subject to the press from (a). If he protects himself from this press by playing at

(a) himself, then black will occupy the important point K17. In such a position as this, is there anything that white can do to protect himself? Let us look at this problem again as it is shown in the lower half.

Here he plays °1, a pincer attack against the black stone. He might have played a low pincer attack at R7, but both are of the same idea. (°R7, °P5, °N3). These pincer attacks are chosen on the assumption that black must answer them. If this is true, then black will not have the time to play below the star, K3. In both pincer attacks, °2 is a necessary reply. After °3, black will find that K3 will lose its effectiveness. Thus the effect of white's attacking the black stone should be studied.




Diagram 71

We now extend the idea of pressing down an opponent to the fourth and fifth lines instead of the third and fourth. All the presses shown in Diagram 71 are made from the fifth line. Although the same word is used in expressing the action (kake in Japanese) this type of press is not disadvantageous to the player being pressed. Instead, it is definitely disadvantageous to the player making the press. In the upper right, the black stones are on the fourth and third lines° the player who responds to such pressing




Diagram 72

tactics actually gains benefits and security. There is no case where the responding side suffers disadvantages. In the upper left, black skips a line between °4 and °6, and does not suffer any ill effects from the press. Only if black responds as shown in Diagram 72 will white gain anything from the position. This important point should be remembered.

On the lower left in Diagram 71 we have a position given in books on joseki. °3 is incorrect and should be played at (a) instead. By playing as white does, he forces black to play °4 and °6: black is satisfied to extend indefinitely. In the lower right, we have a position which is often found in match games. The usual move in this position is °1 as shown. After °2, should white follow by playing to the left of °2, black will also extend. As these exchanges increase, white will lose from each one. The idea of a loss in pressing from the fifth line may be considered an axiom.




Diagram 73

X. The Second Line is the Line of Defeat

Having discussed these ideas about pressing on the third line, and some play on the fourth and fifth lines, I would like to explain why I call the second line the line of defeat.

Why is it important not to play on the second line except as an auxiliary move to the third and fourth line?




Diagram 74

Let us start out with the example of Diagram 73. If black plays °1 on the star to disconnect white's two stones, what should white do? Continuing as shown in Diagram 74, we see a case where white is determined to keep communications open between both stones. Black has a choice of several moves, but here chooses °3 in answer to °2. °4 can be placed in either direction. Then black plays °5, not intending to interfere with white's plans.

Continuing in Diagram 75, white finally connects up along the whole upper side. When looking at the low formation of white in contrast to the thick outer wall of black, we will find that black's advantages are unmistakably clear.

Sometimes black mistakenly sees white attempting to connect and becomes determined to stop this action. In Diagram 76 and 77, we see the results. After black places °1 in Dia-




Diagram 75




Diagram 76




Diagram 77

gram 77, white invades the corner. In such positions as this, black's only gain is that he succeeded in his purpose of disconnecting both groups, but the actual gains of white may be greater. It is clever and at the same time simpler to permit white groups to connect on the second line, in view of the disadvantages of the second line.




Diagram 78




Diagram 79

In the additional example of Diagram 78, we have a familiar position in joseki. The usual course that white will follow depends on whether or not the resulting ladder will be in his favor. If not, he follows Diagram 79. If it is in his favor, he follows Diagram 80. Now let us suppose that white defies this rule, and follows Diagram 80 without having the ladder in his favor. Because he cannot capture the blocking stone, he creeps along the second line to save himself. Even if he lives, he suffers the loss




Diagram 80




Diagram 81

of a poor exchange of small territory for black's strong outside wall. The result is shown in Diagram 81.

In opening strategy, if plays on the second line occur frequently, it will mean a disadvantage to the side making these plays. This should be remembered always.

XI. The Open Skirt

In Diagram 82, we see a position arising from a joseki in the upper right. The formation of black stones around white appears to be a "skirt" except that a stone is missing at the point (a). This type of position is known as an "open skirt".




Diagram 82

In this position, white can extend out from the corner by playing at the point below (a), but black does not worry about this at the beginning phase since it is merely a second-line expansion. At the proper point he will

press down on any such expansion. However, it will make a difference in the stone placement. The direction of expansion from this black formation is not only towards the center but toward both sides. Which does he choose in deciding where to consolidate? There must be a difference among them, and opening strategy should not be carried out without considering such differences.

On the upper side, if black succeeds in playing at (b) and the point two lines below (b), then the area in this direction is almost black's. On the other hand, if black succeeds in playing at (c) on the right side, and the point two lines to the left of (c) the area in this direction cannot be said to be black's unless he occupies the point (a). This white will not allow without compensation. Therefore in this joseki, players learn that the area of expansion is on the upper side primarily and on the right side secondarily. White, then, will try to stop this by playing on the upper side. Thus white's first play should be G17, not R7.

In Diagram 83, black places his stone low on the right side, attempting to use his influence downward. After 2 and 3, it appears that black has placed great importance in his attempt to secure area on that side.




Diagram 83




Diagram 84

Now whether white occupies the point (a) or not depends on the overall situation. If there is a place elsewhere on the board more to white's advantage he would not play at (a). Still black cannot feel at ease, but must be on constant guard against white's jumping into this point. In view of this, is there no way in which black can place along the right side?

Black might well play high at °1 as shown in Diagram 84, in line with his original play with an outward direction. Black should not fear that white will invade at B12: the high placement around °1 is the desirable point. In short, whenever there is an open skirt the high fourth line should be chosen by either side. Also it should be remembered that the nearer a third line placement is to the direction of the open skirt, the worse the move becomes.




Diagram 85

In Diagram 85, what should black do in answer to °1, in view of the open skirt at the lower right? The first thing that is clear is that black should not play below °1. A principle to apply to this sort of invasion is that it should be stopped from the wider side. The right side is larger, but in combination with the two center stones you will find the upper area is the larger.




Diagram 86

Diagram 86 shows the sequel. In this formation, the two center black stones would ideally be placed another line to the left. On the right side, black cannot hope to secure much territory. A strong variation for black on his fourth move is shown in Diagram 87. Black compels white's moves °5-11 and then places °12. The result is that the right side has been neutralized by white due to the open skirt at both ends. But black has developed a strong area, which will have a powerful influence on the center before the game has reached a conclusion.





Diagram 87

A SIX - STONE GAME



1 - 100

(THIS GAME originally appeared in Iwamoto's "How to Improve your Go." The comments are supplied by Iwamoto, 8th Dan, who also played white in this game. Black is taken by Ohashi, Sho Dan, who won by two points.)

*8 O6. Rather weak: better R16. Had *7 been at M3 instead of L3, then there was a threat that white might follow up with N5 or R3. As it stands, though, there is little immediate danger.

*12 Q13. Black should first protect the corner with R16, but if he wishes to save Q10 at this moment he should have played *12 P12, so as not to force the issue in the upper corner. After the Q13 commitment, the sequence through *16 is natural.

*17 R12. Too early. Better *S16, *R17, *R12, and if next *R13, *S13 and black cannot cut at S12.

*20 S12. Should white reply S11, then *S14, *T12+, *S15 to be followed by *O14 or *P11. The situation will be difficult for white.

*22 R11. No---by all means T13! This applies to all such formations. Beginners seem to harbor a fear of ko, which is entirely groundless.

*29 G17. White could play S4 instead, but then black may play G16---also very big.

*30 H3. Good. Now white is in trouble.

*31 E5. If instead *C3, then *D3, *D2, *E2, *C2, *E3, *B5. White would be secure in the corner, but black is free to play K4---not good for white.

*34 G4. Good.

*38 E4. Safe, but a bit weak. Black could have played K6 to threaten the whites below.

*46 M8. The jump to K9 would have been proper, but M8 is acceptable in a six stone game: it makes for easier play for black.


*56 R3. Weak. Better to play the following sequence: *56 R5, *Q5, *Q6, *R6, *P5+, *S5, *Q5, *S7 and *R3.

*65 K2. White is alive, but black's outside influence has increased. The situation is still difficult for white.

*66 K8. Unnecessary--better to play S3. Still stronger: *66 R6, *Q6, *S3, threatening the white group.

*68 K17. Black could have played J17. His position is solid and he can afford to play very strongly.

(continued on page 32)



101 - 156

THE AMERICAN GO JOURNAL is published by the American Go Association, 96 Cedar Avenue, Hackensack, New Jersey. Subscription is included with member-

ship in the American Go Association. Membership dues are \$4.00 per year. Back issues: \$4.00 per volume, \$1.00 per copy. Printed in U.S.A.

Editors William Labov
Robert McCallister
Production Lester Morris

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Koshi Takashima
Business Manager Frank Scalpone

OF SOLID MATTER

WE PROMISED readers something of a generous size, a solid and substantial contribution for this double issue of the Go Journal; the twenty-page chapter from Takagawa's Principles of Opening Strategy should fulfill every expectation.

Among the leading Japanese players, Takagawa appears to have the greatest talent for uncovering the general principles behind his own reasoning. We grant that his "Advanced Strategy" is hard going, but this discussion of "How to Play Along the Side" should be meat and drink for players of all levels. Those who have studied the systematic series on Joseki should be especially pleased to have a theoretical work of this kind to pursue. In later issues we intend to print the chapter on "How to Handle Corners" and "Territorial Formation".

The American Go Journal Anthology is printed, bound, and ready for distribution to all readers. You will receive this 48-page book free on renewing your membership in the Go Association, together with Volume 7, No. 3. At \$1.50 apiece, you can also have all the extra copies you want. To tell the truth, we have allowed a few advance copies of this remarkably handsome book to wander about the Go world, in order to whet your appetite. If ever a journal had 100% renewals, this should be the occasion. We don't intend to lose a single reader!


The work of preparing the Go Journal Anthology was done by a committee


including Karl Robinson, Takao Matsuda, Lester Morris, Norbert Jay, Teddy Feldman, and the editors of the Go Journal. To Lester Morris goes a special measure of appreciation for the organizing, planning and production of this book; sixty diagrams were re-photographed to insure the precision and clarity which our figures have always maintained. Those readers who advance into middle age with 20/20 vision may thank him for this gift.

Finally, readers should know that this Anthology was only possible with the enthusiastic cooperation of Mr. John Goodell, who financed the greatest part of the printing cost. Mr. Goodell plans to use the Anthology in his over-all nationwide promotion of Go, to be reported fully in our next issue.

STUDENTS AND FRIENDS of Takao Matsuda have long known that he is writing a book on "Basic Form in Go". Without doubt this will be the most significant work of its character to appear in the English language.

The American Go Journal will have the honor of publishing Mr. Matsuda's book in serial form. The first installment is planned for the next issue, Volume 7, Number 3.






THE SECOND EUROPEAN GO-CONGRESS was held in August at Altenmarkt near Vienna, Austria. The chairman of the Austrian Go Club, Dipl. Ing. Friedrich Susan has written to give us news of this meeting, and Fritz Kastilan of the American Go Association has also given us a report of his visit to the Congress.

The Congress was opened by the Japanese ambassador to Austria, and the opening ceremonies were given television, radio and motion-picture coverage, as well as a good press in the European newspapers.

Preparations are going forward for the formation of a European Go Federation, under the supervision of Herr Susan, who is also interested in setting up a regular relations with our own American Go Association.

A tournament for the European Go championship was held at the Congress, and won by Dr. Dueball of Berlin (Sandan). The six leading European players competed, each playing one game with every opponent. Time limit was three hours apiece, and black gave a komi of 5-1/2 points. The other five participants were: Dr. Lenz, Aachen (Shodan); Giessow, Berlin (Nidan); John, Berlin (Sandan); Grebe, Eschbach (Nidan); and Dipl. Ing. Susan, Vienna (Shodan).



THOSE WHO ARE FAMILIAR with Dr. Gilbert W. Rosenthal's book, A Go Primer, will be pleased to hear that it is again available in print.

Dr. Rosenthal's book is a very extensive, well thought-out introduction to Go, dealing primarily with the 13-line board. It consists of 80 pages, 8-1/2 x 11", bound in soft covers. The text is typewritten, but reproduced with exceptional clarity, and the diagrams are excellent.


Written in 1943, this primer deals adroitly with many of the puzzling points which bother beginners. Dr. Rosenthal's devotes his first chapter to "The Elements of Go". His second

chapter is entitled "Minor Tactics", and in it he takes up such subjects as "True and False Eyes", "Death from Within", "Saving and Killing Groups", with well-chosen diagrams to illustrate his explanations. He devotes 10 pages to Joseki, and in the appendix lists 100 Even and Handicap Joseki in a tabular form.

A Go Primer may be ordered from

Dr. Gilbert W. Rosenthal
4009 Liberty Heights Avenue
Baltimore 7, Maryland

PROBLEMS:



- Problem 1: White to play, black dies
Problem 2: White to play and achieve Ko
Problem 3: White to play, black dies
Problem 4: White to play, black dies

(answers on page 31)

RAISING YOUR STRENGTH

IV. Playing White for the First Time

THIS IS THE FOURTH article in a series designed to help beginners improve their Go playing. The series on Raising Your Strength does not pretend to be authoritative, nor comprehensive, nor exhaustive, but it is intended as a measure of help where help is most needed. The articles are based on the agreed principles found in more advanced studies, both published and unpublished, that are available in English translation.

SOME OF US learned to play Go with a friend, who knew no more about the game than we did. We began playing even games---usually one big battle---and after several years of learning the hard way, we found others who played Go.

But this is not the usual pattern today, especially in the larger cities. Most players learn from someone who gives them nine stones, and it is some time before they can even play at eight. After 10, 20 or 50 games with a big handicap, on a given day a revolution occurs: they have to give a handicap, and play white. The effect can be paralyzing.

For a beginner playing white for the first time, the question is, "What do I do now?" He is accustomed to mark out territory and defend it; yet everywhere he looks, black is there first. In this article, we will outline a few general lines for white to proceed on, with some concrete suggestions. For those not yet playing white, this may be instructive---to be forewarned in advance about white's thinking in his campaign against you.

The handicap is essential and natural to the game of Go. There is no true even game, for giving the first move itself is a substantial handicap. In a master's "even" game, just as in

your nine-stone potboiler, white's driving purpose is to catch up to black, to neutralize his advantage. Correct play for black is not necessarily correct play for white. White must try to make each move slightly stronger than black's. This is a rather mysterious concept, but what follows may help to make it clearer.

If you are playing white, you probably are superior in (1) knowledge of theory and openings, and (2) experience in handling complicated situations. Our general procedure will be to explore first the extent of our advantage in knowledge, and exploit it. If black's advantage can be neutralized strategically, so much the better. At the same time, we should lose no opportunity to draw white into close in fighting, where the advantage of his handicap stones in other sections is not yet felt.

Opening in the Corners

Our first step will be to test black's knowledge of corner play by trying several different openings in various corners. If black fails to answer correctly, white can pursue the following general ideas, as illustrated in Diagram 1.

In the upper left of Diagram 1, we see that white has played a familiar joseki. If black should omit playing at F15 or G15, he is leaving the corner open to an effective invasion at E17. White knows this, but does not leap in immediately in response to black's neglect. Instead, he would continue with J15, and proceed to seal off the corner from the center. His thinking is this: if black does not recognize his omission now, he probably will not see it later. If black assumes that the corner is safe, the




Diagram 1

invasion will be all the more effective at a later time, when he is entirely cut off from the center. At the same time, J15 has another purpose, looking for territory to the right, and is therefore a sound move. (For more details on this Joseki, see AGJ, Vol. 2, No. 2).

In the upper right, white pursues the same thought, playing on either side of black's corner. If white fails to play out at O14, black will seize this point to complete his encirclement. *6 is not a good move in this case as we know, because black has developed strong white groups on both sides, and left himself with the two weak points R17 and R15.

In the lower right of Diagram 1, we see how white has the possibility of invading with *11 and *5, even after black plays out with *8. The black group can be attacked successfully, and here too, timing is everything in staging an invasion. If black assumes that his arm into the center is based on a perfectly safe group, he will not be anxious to connect up to other armies.

In the lower left, black has answered *1 with a standard Joseki which can secure the corner (see AGJ, Vol. 1, No. 2). From study, we understand that black's best play is at K3 for his final expansion. Otherwise, his

wall counts for nothing. But most beginners are too timid for this play, and will be content with G3 or H3 (or even E3!) As a result, white can feel that he has made a real gain with J3, though of course there is no great hurry about this move. In placing a weak stone, black has incurred a loss which cannot be regained.

There are cases where white should take advantage of a weakness immediately; these usually involve black's failure to connect his stones. In the common examples of Diagram 2, we see two variations of a joseki that allow white to cut. In the upper left, white loses no time in cutting at *17, hoping to involve black in a fight for one or the other group. In the upper right, as a matter of principle, white cuts at *13, knowing that black will




Diagram 2

be able to capture with *16. If black fails to do so, of course white will play P15 himself. But even if black does play properly, white always has the sente play O15: note that this does not give black an eye at P16.

In considering a cut, it is important to judge black's reaction early in the game, and study his weaknesses in the handling of these situations. The "Scissors" Joseki is most useful for this purpose. If black knows this joseki, shown on the lower right of Diagram 3, especially the vital move *6, the chances are that this same cutting maneuver will not prove helpful to white elsewhere. Yet white has done no great harm by his experiment. But if black answers *6 R6 or *6 P3, it indicates that he does not know the principle, "Be the first to double a stone", and white can slash away like a madman with good results.

These diagrams illustrate the type of weaknesses which white should ex-




Diagram 3

plore, in black's understanding of joseki. They can be summed up:

- (1) Failure to lead out to the center.
- (2) Failure to secure the corner.
- (3) Failure to expand far enough from a strong wall.
- (4) Failure to connect.

White's cue on noting these omissions will be to

- (1) Seal off the corner.
- (2) Wait for a proper time to invade.
- (3) Expand his territory at the expense of black.
- (4) Cut.

Note that in most of these examples white's moves are not especially bold. The weakness to be guarded against on his side is that he is playing from both sides, and a vigorous attack from black might capture one or the other. It is unlikely, though that black will be able to seize this advantage properly.

Overall Opening Strategy

We now come to the question of Fuseki, or overall opening strategy. Even if black knows his corner openings, white can usually rely on gaining ground in forming territory over the whole board.

It stands to reason that white must often extend himself further than he normally would, and this part of the meaning of the concept "a stronger move". Sometimes this means wider extensions, as in the upper side of Diagram 3. (Note that white's play will be fully justified if black should make the common error of playing P17, O16.) Sometimes white will make a larger jump towards the center, as in the lower right of Diagram 3, although this type of play requires considerable skill to defend.

However, there are many openings where white does not play boldly, nor especially well, yet by systematically playing against each black corner in turn, he builds up enough territorial potential to neutralize black's handicap. In Diagram 4 we see such an opening from a game between players of moderate strength. Because of its simplicity and pedestrian character, it serves to illustrate the principle involved here.




Diagram 4

The corners are played with reasonable correctness on black's part. White is disappointed if he had hoped to seize any corner immediately, and all four corners are leading out to the center. Yet since white has maintained the initiative, the potential point score is now almost even, if white were to be granted all his

claims. White threatens to enlarge his upper and lower side, but black has no territory which can be obviously expanded.

The principle that white followed here was to make use of as few stones as possible to wall off territory. °17 and °15 are supported by °19 and °29; °5 and °9 are backed by °13 and °25. Now that white has given up the initiative, he awaits black's invasion. He does not fear an invasion---rather, he hopes for one.

Inviting an Invasion

If black were wise, he would simply press down at such places as E10 or D11, K5, Q10, O14, L14 and H14. These are all powerful sente plays which would constrict white, preserve the initiative for black, connect all black groups to the center, and possibly pick up 10 or 20 points in the center. From this point of view, the white game is very weak, and black has nothing to fear.

At this point, then, the game hangs in the balance. White hopes that black will plunge in with a deeper invasion, such as K4 or L15. Let us say that black plays K4. White may decide on the seemingly defensive strategy of K2, to connect his two sides. Black may cut vigorously with °J2, which will lead to some complicated fighting, or more likely he will play less aggressively, as shown in Diagram 5.

White has apparently given up a large territory, but his future plans hold much more promise. They revolve about a five-fold possibility:

(1) cutting the right hand corner off from the center and attacking at R5 and R3;

(2) attacking the similar weakness of the upper left corner at C17 and E17;

(3) leaning heavily on black's safety play E6 with °8 F6, and continuing later with D6 perhaps, or E5;

(4) the same by playing at O14 in the upper right;

(5) using the above threats to cut off the center group, or using the threat against the center group to win a corner.




Diagram 5

Thus we see how a pedestrian white game, full of weaknesses, can come to life and hope by one ill-advised invasion of black.

A great more can be said on the question of white invading black territory, but it would probably run beyond the scope of this article. The reader is referred to Kajiwara's article on "Invasion of Border Territories", in AGJ, Vol. 3, No. 3, 4, and Vol. 4, No. 2. Where white takes the initiative in invading, his method of play will be adjusted to the skill of his opponent, and his need for reducing the opponent's advantage in points.

There is also a great deal to be said on the question of counting: not so much on how to count, but rather on when and why to do so. Some of the advantages to be derived from counting are not immediately obvious, as well as the difference in actual play determined by the count. A future article in Raising Your Strength will be devoted solely to this subject.

Closing Up the Second Line

White can expect to reap at least ten points by being the first to make the big sente plays on the second and first lines. He should recognize the time to make these before black does--and even if he is wrong, the chances

are that black will not challenge his decision. Looking at Diagram 5, we see that it will take a great deal of confidence on black's part to ignore a play at P18, at this early stage of the game. White can also expect to play S12, O2, E2, and B8 before black.

The question for white to decide is not whether black will respond to these plays. Black usually will. The point is that once white settles these open areas, he has much less chance of capturing the black corner, by sound or unsound means. He should not play P2 until he has abandoned hope of capturing the black corner, because he may want to follow plays at R15 or S16 with R18. When a careful count has convinced him that he does not need a black corner to win, then it is time to make these second line plays.

Searching for Weaknesses

Let us suppose that black has defeated all white expectations by sound play in the corners, leading out to the center, avoiding complications, and is comfortably ahead. White will now begin to search the board for weak connections of black that will allow him to cut. In Diagram 6, we see a tableau of weak connections, which white plays to exploit.




Diagram 6

On the upper right, we see the common or garden variety knight's move, which readers of this series will instantly recognize as no connection at all. On the upper left is the L-shaped formation, which is vulnerable to a play at °1 once white has secured himself with °J3. The reason that black often makes this play is that he sees it in master games; but unless he knows when to defend it, it is more of a liability to him than an asset.

On the left side, white makes a telling point with °1 D9. This weakness looks obvious here, but it often occurs in more complicated situations which black fails to recognize.

On the lower side, white's °1 G3 splits two stones that are one space too far apart, and with 1 M5, he cuts off a stone too far flung towards the center.

On the right of Diagram 6, we may note that the single-skip moves towards the center have lost their connective value for black, because of the flanking white formations. A cut at °1 or °a will prove effective.

There are many more such weaknesses that may be catalogued, but these are the basic six which white can search for.

In Diagram 7, we see several common weaknesses which crop up in the middle




Diagram 7

and end game. On the upper left, °1 is worth more points than the ordinary play at A16. White should never play on the first line, as at A16, until he is sure that the situation will not allow B17. In many cases, the whole black group may fall.

The type of false eye shown at B9 and E9 should be attacked wherever possible with plays at those points. As shown here, °B9 wins the four black stones, while E9 destroys an eye which black may need. This sente play can be made the moment the formation occurs, which brings up the subject of

Timing

In almost every game, the formation shown on the lower side of Diagram 7 will occur, with variations. If white is to take advantage of it, it must be early, while the sequence °1 K2, °L2, °H2, °K1+, G2 will still be effective. Another possibility would be °1 H2, °G2, °K2, °H1+, °M3, °L2, °M2, °K1+, °N2+. But once black has played M3, or F3, or any similar move in the vicinity, the opportunity vanishes. In other words, there are times when you cannot rely on the fact that black doesn't see the weakness: the normal course of play will wipe out the chance.

In the upper right we see a complicated situation, where both the black group and the white group are in jeopardy. If white sees this situation coming before black does, the move °1 at N14 will effectively reduce black's breathing spaces. Black will save the two black stones by M14. But if white waits until the fight develops to the present pitch, surely black will see that it will not pay him to save these two, but rather to proceed with °P19, °Q19, °T14, which should lead to seki. So the life of the black group strictly depends on his not responding to M14. White's foresight in playing this move early would probably lead to a won game.

Note the difference between °1N14 and the move M16. It makes no difference when white plays M16 since the threat to connect must be answered.

Never Give Up

One of the best weapons in white's arsenal is persistence. Remembering all the games he has lost in the last stages, he is not quick to throw in the towel. When orthodox moves fail him, he tries the heterodox. He turns disaster into victory by a readiness to change his plans, by shifting the focus of his attention more easily than his opponent. He plays on top of black, under black, over black if necessary, to shake the established pattern which the weaker player relies on. However, there are some tactics which are generally felt to be legitimate and dignified, and others beneath the worth of a Go player.

It is sound play to confuse the opponent by switching rapidly to different parts of the board. It is not sound to confuse him by anything you say or the expression on your face.

It is sound play to test your opponent's ability to defend his territory, and take it away from him if he cannot. It is not sound to make a whole series of useless moves, filling in dame spaces, hoping that he will not see the one connection he is forced to make.


It is sound play to throw down a stone rapidly and firmly at a critical point. To intimidate your opponent by the rapidity and sureness of your moves is certainly legitimate. But it is foul play indeed to hurry him in a moment of crisis by showing impatience or asking, "My move?" with thinly disguised irony.

We trust that this study of "Playing White for the First Time" will prove helpful in building a little confidence in the rank beginner. For the rest, it may be interesting, provocative, or perhaps irritating, as the mood may strike them. This article reflects the game of Go as it is played; not as an exact science, nor a precise discipline; but as an expression of our common strengths and weaknesses. If it leads to more of the former, fewer of the latter, it will have accomplished its chief aim.

SACRIFICE STONE TACTICS

By Kensaku Segoe

Basic Diagram 8



The configuration of stones shown in the basic diagram was taken from a game between Honinbo Takagawa and Shimamura, 8th Dan, playing black, in one of the challenger's tournaments for the Honinbo title.

The moves through 5 form a frequently used joseki, where 3 and 5 answer white's squeeze play at 2. But 6 is a new play by Takagawa which involves a sacrifice stone tactic. Incidentally, any player who can grasp the meaning of 6 by himself is of Shodan strength.

Figure 8-A shows the usual joseki play instead of 6 in the basic diagram. This is considered locally disadvantageous for black, but it is appropriate in certain general situations. For instance, in the present arrangement black recovers immediately by 4 the local loss incurred in the upper corner.




Diagram 8-A

Diagram 8-B

The sequel of 8-A is shown in Figure 8-B: even if white carries out the maneuver of 5, etc., he is simply adding to the black forces, and leaving himself no room for further maneuvering. If he plays 9 instead at E12, black will reply with B13, and the situation is no better for white. The full significance of black's position is developed here.

Now let us return to the original play of Takagawa, shown here as 1 in Figure 8-C. If black replies in the spirit of 8-A without thinking ahead, 3 puts the white group into its most





Diagram 8-C

Diagram 8-D

efficient shape ("katachi"). °4 then incurs the sequence through the cut at °9; as a result, black's position is inferior to that in the previous figure, in both shape and strength. In short, the new play at C-16 was intended to prevent black's expansion at °2.

Thus black's °2 of Figure 8-D is almost mandatory. White's °3 shows the success of white's planning to a certain degree. The exchange of °5 and °6 is a defense against a future black invasion at C7: This, combined with °7 and °9, represent a maximum achievement of °2 in the basic diagram as a sacrifice stone.

On the other hand, if black studies all the above tactical implications of °C16, he can also detect another tactic for himself to take advantage of a white weakness not present in the normal Figure 8-A.



This compensating attack involves neglecting the white approach from below and playing instead °1 of Figure 8-E. White's °4 and °6 are forced. Thereupon black wedges in °7, cutting into the white area in coordination with °3.





Figure 8-F shows the continuation. Nothing can be expected from °8 and °10, which end in the unreasonable result of leaving a weak separated white group wandering about in the center. The stone at F18 has played a distinguished role in ravaging the white sphere of influence, and °7 should be noted well.



Finally, Figure 8-G shows a variation in white's fourth move of 8-E. White tries to oppress black with °1 and °3, but still black easily finds a way to live with °8 and retains sente. Thus 8-E is a better path for white.

All in all, the new play °6 of the Basic Diagram is effective in containing black's plays on the left side, but at the same time it comprises white's own weakness in the upper region.



Answers to PROBLEMS on page 23

Problem 1: °B15, °C15, °A14, °B18, °B16, °A15, °A16, °A17, °C19, °D18, °D19, °E18, °E19

or °B15, °C15, °A14, °B16, °B18, °C18, °B19, °D18, °B19; then if °C19, °A15, °E18, °E19, °F19, °E19

Problem 2: °T16, °S15, °T18, °T17, °S17+

Problem 3: °B2!, °C2, °B3, °C3, °A6, °A4, °D1

Problem 4: °T2, °T3, °S3, °T4, °P3, °R2, °Q3, °R3, °S2, °Q2, °P1, °Q1, °S1


or °T2, °T4, °P3, °Q3, °R2, °Q2, °S1, °S3, °P1, °Q1, °S2

A RULE FOR SEKI

[This article may be considered a follow-up to Mr. Fukuda's lesson on counting liberties. It is adapted from articles by Kensaku Segoe which originally appeared in Igo Club magazine.]

Figure 1 A shows a border situation in which a white chain on line D is in conflict with a black chain on lines D and F. The chains have no eyes, but share two vacant points (E1 and E2). Will one die, or will both live in seki? It is convenient to be able to predict the outcome.

To predict, count the unshared liberties to which each chain connects. Let the greater number be X. In this case X is 6, since White connects to 6 unshared liberties on line C, whereas Black connects to only 5 on line G.



White, then, is the stronger chain. (If the outside or unshared liberties of the fighting chains are equal in number, arbitrarily call White the stronger and let X equal his "outside" liberties.)

For the other chain, count the total number of liberties and call this number Y. In this case Y is 7, since Black is the other chain and connects to 7 liberties - 5 on line G plus 2 on line E.

The following rules apply to situations such as this - that is, semeai (fights) between chains which share two or more vacant points.

1. If $X = Y$, the stronger chain kills, no matter who plays first.

2. If $X = Y - 1$, the stronger kills if he plays first, but it is seki if the other begins.

3. If $X = Y - 2$, it is seki no matter who starts.

4. If $X = Y - 3$, the weaker can afford to ignore the first attack. The stronger can ignore his opponent's attacks until the roles are reversed and rule 3 applies.

Figure 1B illustrates the $X = Y - 1$ rule - White kills if he starts, Black achieves seki if he has the lead. The intersections L16, L14, M16, M14 are of no account - for example if White starts we have °1 M14, °2 L14, °3 M16, °4 L16 - and now the real count can be made. White has 6 unshared liberties, Black 5 (on line N) and two shared.



(continued from page 21)

°70 E15. No, this invites white into the corner. The correct play was °70 E17, °71 G15?, °E14.

°86 B16. Weak; should have played E11, and attack the white chain.

°88 K13. Better to play E10, then if °F11, °K13.

°97 H10. Now white is safe here, but black is still ahead in points.

°104 G8. Weak. The following sequence would have kept sente, and gained for black about seven points: 104 N2, °M2, °N4, °M3, and °O2.

°125 S8. Big; it forestalls °S6, a sente play worth six or seven points.

°132 G16. Black can't play H18 instead, because then °G18, °H17 and °F15 cutting off the six blacks

The record breaks off at move 156; as stated above, black won by two points.